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Abstract Recent trends and climate models suggest that the Arctic summer sea ice cover is likely to be
lost before climate interventions can stabilize it. There are environmental, socioeconomic, and sociocul-
tural arguments for, but also against, restoring and sustaining current conditions. Even if global warming
can be reversed, some people will experience ice-free summers before perennial sea ice begins to return.
We ask: How will future generations feel about bringing sea ice back where they have not experienced
it before? How will conflicted interests in ice-covered vs. ice-free conditions be resolved? What role will
science play in these debates?
1. Introduction
Twenty-four years after the Framework Convention on Climate Change sought to avoid “dangerous” climate
change [United Nations, 1992], CO2 concentrations at the Mauna Loa observatory have crossed a significant
threshold: >400 ppm CO2 year round [Betts et al., 2016]. While it is difficult to specify a boundary between
“safe” and “dangerous” warming, the debate is currently centered between 1.5∘ and 2∘ above 1990 levels
[e.g., Hansen et al., 2013a]. To stabilize at a given global mean temperature, the allowable CO2 concentration
depends on “climate sensitivity,” the response of the climate system to greenhouse gas forcing. Sensitivity
estimates from models and paleoclimate data vary by a factor of about two, but a central estimate is about
2∘C warming per 1000 GtC (gigatons of carbon) cumulative emissions [Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al.,
2009; Matthews et al., 2012; Hansen et al., 2013a, 2013b]. Thus, the target set in Paris in 2015 [United Nations,
2016] of no more than 2∘C increase above preindustrial mean temperature implies holding cumulative CO2
emissions below about 1000 GtC. Emissions since industrialization have already been over 500 GtC and are
currently about 10 GtC/year [Le Quere et al., 2015]. The only IPCC concentration pathway that holds tempera-
tures within the Paris limit is the Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6 (RCP2.6) [van Vuuren et al., 2011],
in which net emissions peak in the next few years and are zero, or even slightly negative, by about 2050.
Similarly, Hansen et al. [2013a] estimate that to hold the climate within the range experienced since the last
deglaciation will require at least a 6% annual reduction in carbon emissions. Achieving such a trajectory is
daunting from social, technical, and economic perspectives as it requires a massive and rapid decarboniza-
tion of the economy coupled with very aggressive reforestation or artificial means of sequestering carbon
from the atmosphere.
Beyond the technical issues, the challenge of controlling, managing, or possibly reversing the impacts of
human activities on our planet has an increasingly visible other dimension to which we believe too little
attention has been paid: the conflicting interests of different stakeholder communities. In many instances,
this arises as a conflict between industries, political segments, or even nations that have an interest in
continuing business as usual, deferring any environmental costs to the future, versus those that desire
immediate action to mitigate or remediate environmental problems in order to maintain existing condi-
tions or return to a state perceived as healthier or more in balance with nature. There are communities of




• The Arctic is likely to experience
ice-free summers for decades before
warming can be reversed through
mitigation or engineering solutions
• Diverse, often conflicting interests
will emerge as ecological conditions,
economies, and societies adapt to
the new climate
• Development of options for
adaptation or a return to perennial
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Figure 1. The temperature tendency, 1950–2013, in degrees Celsius per decade (NASA Earth Observatory: http://earthobservatory.nasa.
gov/IOTD/view.php?id=82918&eocn=home&eoci=iotd_title).
shaped by continued and unabated human activity. We are thus entering into a phase of discussions about
how to respond to the impacts of anthropogenically induced environmental change that is characterized
by a growing tension between stakeholders who would like to minimize or reverse the impact of human
activities and those who would like to exploit them and thus are not interested in remediation.
In the Arctic, which has historically been too cold for many types of industrial activity, and where temper-
ature is rising more than twice as fast as the planetary average (Figure 1), these dynamics are playing out
more rapidly, and in some ways more dramatically, than at lower latitudes. Warming is already reducing sea
ice (Figure 2), driving glacial retreat [Stroeve et al., 2012; Tedesco et al., 2015], and expanding growing sea-
sons [Zheng et al., 2011] as the Arctic moves towards a new annual cycle that includes a largely ice-free (less
than 1 million square km) ocean in the summer [Overpeck et al., 2005; Mahlstein and Knutti, 2012].
Figure 2. Observed and simulated Arctic sea ice minimum. Black:
observations. Colors: IPCC models with radiative forcing from the
Representative Concentration Pathways. Green: RCP2.6, Blue: 4.5, Yellow:
6.0, Red: 8.5. Solid lines are ensemble averages. (Adapted from Stroeve
et al., 2012. Accessed at: http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/
our-changing-climate/melting-ice).
Some interest groups are actively planning
for an opening of the Arctic Ocean, including
a number who are already investing in new
infrastructure to take advantage of emerging
economic opportunities. For example, at the
newly formed Arctic Circle, which convenes
businesses and organizations from around
the world to “strengthen the international
focus on the future of the Arctic,” climate
change is a central focus.
Emergence of an ice-free Arctic summer
raises issues that we have never had to deal
with before, including what, if anything, can
be done to preserve a “white” Arctic and
whether, in fact, anything should be done?
Below, we use the implications of the loss
of Arctic sea ice as an example for how
to frame emerging tensions and to explore
which options exist to navigate the increas-
ingly complex task of responding to Arctic environmental change.
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Figure 3. Anticipated future Arctic transit routes superimposed over Navy consensus assessment of sea ice extent minima in 2012, 2020,
2025, and 2030. Graphics courtesy of the U.S. Navy (http://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=5256).
Table 1. A Partial List of the Services Provided by Arctic Sea Ice With (Left) and Outside (Right) the Arctic Region.
Within-Arctic Sea Ice Services Global Arctic Sea Ice Services
Wildlife habitat Planetary albedo
Subsistence hunting and fishing Ocean circulation
Coastal infrastructure support Carbon storage
Intra-Arctic security Atmosphere and weather
Sea level
International security
2. Rationale for Sustaining a White Arctic
For at least the last 6000 years, the central Arctic Ocean has been covered by a perennial ice pack so that
its liquid surface was only exposed to the atmosphere through leads and polynyas (small, often intermit-
tent, openings in the sea ice) [Walsh and Chapman, 2014]. The seasonally ice-free zone (the area ice-free in
summer but ice-covered in winter) was located, as long as humans have been there to observe it, almost
entirely over the broad continental shelves that ring the Arctic Ocean (Figure 3). Losing the central Arctic sea
ice in summer means dramatic changes both in the Arctic and beyond [e.g., Frances and Vavrus, 2012; Lantuit
et al., 2012; Struzik, 2012; Cohen et al., 2014]. It means altering, or even losing altogether, an existing set of
ecosystem and climate system services based on the historical Arctic conditions. These services have been
widely described elsewhere [e.g., Mauritzen and Haakkinen, 1997; Koenigk et al., 2007; Eicken et al., 2009;
Tarnocai et al., 2009; Hugelius et al., 2014; Schuur et al., 2015] and include the loss of habitat and food sup-
ply [e.g., MacCracken, 2012; Stirling and Derocher, 2012], large impacts on infrastructure, increased security
concerns, increased global warming, and possibly an increase in certain types of extreme weather patterns
in mid latitude (Table 1).
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3. Interests in a Blue Arctic
As existing functions are lost, new ones will arise. Without the light-limiting sea ice cover, biological
production will increase over the central Arctic Ocean [Frey et al., 2015]. Fish species normally limited to
the northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans will likely extend their ranges north into the Arctic
[Kovacs et al., 2011; Laidre et al., 2015]. Terrestrial biomes will migrate north and replace Arctic ones [Post
et al., 2009], and commercial activity in the Arctic is widely expected to increase. Above the Arctic Circle,
there will still be up to 6 months of darkness, and therefore, winter conditions will continue to be cold,
with extensive sea ice cover throughout most of this century. Nonetheless, expanded fishing, oil, and
natural gas exploration and production; mining; shipping (Figure 3) [Arctic Council, 2009; Pelletier and
Lasserre, 2012; Pizzolato et al., 2013; Smith and Stephenson, 2015], and touristic activity [Lemelin et al.,
2012] will increase the demand for labor. It remains to be seen what labor patterns emerge, whether
previously stable or even declining towns will see renewed growth, or if the seasonal migration of workers
will be dominant [Heleniak, 2013; Rasmussen, 2013a, 2013b; Vaguet, 2013; Zalkind, 2013; Heleniak and
Bogoyavlensky, 2014]. Municipal, transportation, and commercial infrastructure will be required to sup-
port these new developments. Between public infrastructure and privately held plants, rigs, platforms,
mines, and ships, it is easy to imagine that over several decades, hundreds of billions of dollars might
be invested to support trillions of dollars’ of resource extraction and other commercial activity [e.g.,
Klett, 2011; Houseknecht et al., 2012a, 2012b]. Of the Arctic lands, 80% lie within northern Canada and
Russia, and both nations have previously expressed strong interest in the development of nonrenew-
able resources, tourism, and civil infrastructure [see, e.g., the Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to
2020—http://www.arctis-search.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020, and Zysk,
2014]. In the United States, there has been a long and often acrimonious debate about whether to aggres-
sively pursue offshore drilling in the Arctic and whether to facilitate oil sands petroleum transportation
to U.S. ports. With the recent change in Canada’s national government and the ascendency of the United
States to the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the Obama and Trudeau administrations are collaborating
on sustainable approaches to Arctic development, which include substantial targets for protected terrestrial
and marine areas (e.g., http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-
and-arctic-leadership). One has to note, nonetheless, that these statements are in the context of pres-
sure from within both governments to increase northern development, including offshore petroleum
extraction, and are potentially at odds with Russian goals for the region. Increased international interest
in membership in the Arctic Council among non-Arctic nations, such as China and Singapore, and the
establishment of the new Arctic Circle are further testament to the increased interest in the opportunities
offered by a changing Arctic.
4. Possibilities for Restoring and Sustaining a White Arctic
If we wanted to restore and sustain a white Arctic, could we? If we cool the region, the answer is almost
certainly yes [Amstrup et al., 2010; Mahlstein and Knutti, 2012]. Model studies indicate that there is little lag
and virtually no hysteresis in the Arctic sea ice response to surface air temperatures [Armour et al., 2011;
Tietsche et al., 2011]. If the Arctic were to be cooled, the sea ice would in all likelihood return; i.e., there is
probably no “point of no return” [Ridley et al., 2012].
Intra-Arctic technological strategies to preserve Arctic sea ice have been proposed, e.g., covering sea ice
with a reflective material, as some ski resorts have done recently with their glaciers, or spraying sea water
into the atmosphere to increase snow and ice formation. However, to date, none has earned wide support
as a physically effective and economically viable solution on the geographic scale of the Arctic Ocean. The
extent and mobility of sea ice renders surface solutions such as these impractical.
Were an economically feasible local—Arctic-specific—cooling technology to be developed, the dynamics
of atmosphere and ocean circulation would seriously steepen the challenge of maintaining Arctic sea ice
as temperatures continued to rise at lower latitudes. Research with climate simulations and observationally
based historical analysis products indicates that atmospheric and oceanic circulation links the Arctic and
lower latitudes tightly in a single climate system. As shown by Tilmes et al. [2014], cooling the Arctic would
accelerate the northward transport of heat in response to the increased north–south temperature gradient.
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There does not appear to be any way to control the surface air temperature over the Arctic Ocean without
changing conditions over the more heavily populated regions of the northern hemisphere.
Rather, in order to regrow a stable summer sea ice cover, the current warming trend would have to
be reversed, and that is unimaginable without large changes on a global scale. Aggressive measures
would be required to reduce the greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere (car-
bon dioxide reduction—CDR) [National Research Council, 2015] through a combination of emissions
reductions—decarbonization of the economy—and carbon capture and sequestration. In addition, some
have proposed climate interventions targeting Arctic cooling through reducing, regionally or globally, the
solar energy reaching the earth’s surface (solar radiation management—SRM) [Crutzen, 2006; Caldeira and
Wood, 2008; National Research Council, 2015].
Cooling the Arctic through SRM remains very controversial. The distributions of light, temperature, and
precipitation will be different, even if the global mean temperature is about the same, and the ecologi-
cal consequences of the differences are not predictable [Ricke et al., 2010]. Modeling studies indicate that
the combination of CDR+ SRM could potentially have severe impacts on a local level [Robock et al., 2008].
In addition, there is currently no institutional basis for deciding when, where, or how much SRM should be
undertaken. One could imagine a scenario in which nations with large agricultural sectors or coastal cities
wish to move forward aggressively with SRM to maintain current crop conditions or combat sea level rise,
while high-latitude nations or those dependent on monsoons, which may be sensitive to solar radiation dis-
tributions, protest. Conflated with the relatively low cost of SRM, one could easily imagine conflicts between
climate winners and losers or competing SRM implementations. It is completely unclear in what court such
a dispute would be adjudicated. In the absence of an effective governance structure, SRM would put a great
deal of power in the hands of the implementing institution(s). Cessation on short time scales would lead
to extremely rapid rebound toward high temperatures [Jones et al., 2013]. There would be rapid loss of sea
ice and broad temperature and precipitation changes on time scales shorter than many plant and animal
generations.
Proponents counter that (1) humans are already engineering the climate system and (2) the urgency of the
situation justifies taking drastic corrective action. For many “geoengineers,” SRM is a necessary stop-gap
measure to minimize environmental damage while we move toward CDR. The debate over whether to
implement SRM and, more broadly, how much to invest in climate stabilization, over what time frame, and
what price to put on carbon pollution is already playing out in academic, political, and economic forums.
The fate of Arctic sea ice hangs on those global policy debates, in which the Arctic, where about 4 million
people live, has a relatively small voice.
5. Regional and Inter-Regional Policy Conflicts
In a sense, we are becoming aware of the globally linked nature of the Arctic climate at the same time that
the Arctic is being drawn ever more tightly into global economic and political systems. Neither the Arctic nor
lower-latitude populations are monolithic in their approach to a warmer planet. Each region is composed of
diverse constituencies with conflicting points of view, and even the basis for each group’s legitimacy is dif-
ferent. Canada will be an interesting example to watch. The previous government’s Arctic policy was very
pro-development (e.g., Canada’s Northern Strategy—http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp),
but the new government has promised a different direction. For example, Canada has granted significant
sovereignty to Inuit people though the settlement of the Inuvialuit Land Claim in the western Canadian Arc-
tic (1984, http://www.irc.inuvialuit.com/about/finalagreement.html) and the creation of the Inuit territory
of Nunavut in the east (1999). Yet the previous Conservative-led Federal government in Ottawa had clearly
stated its intention to pursue ambitious natural resource extraction projects there, perhaps in part because
the Territory remains fiscally dependent, receiving upwards of 92% of revenue from Ottawa [Holmes, 2013],
Critically, the federal government of Canada retains control over all offshore minerals, natural gas, and
energy, which are not addressed in the Nunavut Final Agreement [Colton et al., 2015; Kerr et al., 2015]. The
new Liberal-led Federal government has promised a nation-to-nation relationship with the Inuits. How that
will impact policy around offshore development is uncertain, but one has to note that about 84% of oil
and gas reserves are oceanic [Bird et al., 2008]. The Russian Federation’s plan for the Arctic states straightfor-
wardly that development of its Arctic territories will be aggressive and will serve broad national economic
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interests. Russia, Canada, and the United States are all increasing their military investments in the Arctic
[Government Accounting Office, 2015], where tensions are already increasing, both as a result of resource
competition [Murray, 2012] and as spillover from global conflict [Kapyla and Mikkola, 2013, 2015].
Some Arctic populations see warming, sea ice loss, and habitat changes as severe threats to their tradi-
tional ways of living. Discussions around the founding of a University in Nunavut, for example, focus on
building traditional knowledge in language, art, culture and health. Representatives of the Gwich’in people
have traveled thousands of miles to meet with Indigenous peoples from Latin America to form alliances to
oppose oil drilling. On the other hand, other groups and individuals in Indigenous communities are closely
focused on opportunities for reaping royalties from resource leases. For many Arctic people, fisheries, oil,
gas, and mineral royalties, along with tourism revenues and participation in logistical and shipping indus-
tries, could potentially represent a viable path away from poverty, colonial dependence, and poor health
outcomes. Nuttall [2013], writing about the Greenland parliament’s decision to permit uranium mining,
notes that development plans have resulted in political and social debates encompassing both the develop-
ment issues per se, including environmental and cultural protections, and the process by which decisions
about development will be made in the future. In the face of the ongoing rapid expansion of extractive
industries, Hansen et al. [2016] refer to both “high hopes for the future and anxieties among the local pop-
ulation,” stating that a social impact assessment is needed in Greenland.
Meanwhile, governments of tropical island nations and low-lying coastal nations see global warming as
an existential threat. Some highly developed nations are beginning to regulate carbon and move toward
carbon-neutral energy production. Others, notably the United States, are unable to come to any meaningful
consensus about the existence of a threat from climate change. While the United Nations and the Arctic
Council provide forums in which these issues can be discussed, there are, at present, no venues above the
national level in which such conflicts can be adjudicated, let alone resolved. Within the Arctic, the two most
viable forums are the Arctic Council and the UNCLOS mechanisms, but the first operates in an advisory
capacity, the second lacks a viable enforcement mechanism, and the largest Arctic economy, the United
States, is not a signatory.
The absence of an international governance mechanism leaves critical questions unanswered: Is it possible
to treat Arctic sea ice as part of a global commons, providing critical climate services to the global com-
munity? If so, what governance structure would be required? How would the research community and the
relevant governmental bodies interact to ensure that this very complex and incompletely understood sys-
tem is managed to the best likely outcomes? If the Arctic climate is not treated as a commons, then who
gets to decide whether anything should be done about sea ice loss? Where would dissenting nations or
stakeholders turn to lodge their disagreements? Will the global community of nations allow a single nation,
or small group of nations, to take climate action on its own? If not, how will “optimal” goals be established?
Is it feasible to enforce international consensus regarding climate strategies? What latitude do nongovern-
mental actors, such as large corporations or industry-wide associations, have to act on their own? In the
absence of legal restrictions on climate action, would practical economic constraints lead to self-regulation?
How will the impacts of actions (or inaction) of Arctic nations on extra-Arctic people be taken into account?
And vice versa: what recourse will Arctic nations or peoples have if the actions or inaction of lower-latitude
communities continue to cause radical changes in Arctic conditions? An ice-free Arctic will occupy a strate-
gic position as a Mediterranean sea linking Europe, North America, and Asia. What commercial and military
competitions will arise, and what structures will be required to manage them?
6. Trajectory: White Arctic—Blue Arctic—White Arctic?
Given the scope of changes required to stabilize global climate and the size of investment that would be
stranded in high-carbon infrastructure, we do not believe that greenhouse warming can be reversed in time
to prevent the loss of most of the summer sea ice cover in the Arctic. On the other hand, we do believe that
the high cost of climate change [e.g., Ackerman and Stanton, 2008; Channell et al., 2015] ensures that mea-
sures to reduce atmospheric temperatures will eventually be taken. Temperatures would come back down,
and the perennial sea ice cover would return. If we are correct, there will be a period during which summer
sea ice would diminish followed by a largely sea ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer for perhaps several
decades or longer, followed by a subsequent regrowth of summer sea ice on time scales of decades to
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Figure 4. Projections of minimum sea ice extent (SIE) under a
business as usual pathway (RCP8.5) and a modified scenario
that assumes aggressive decarbonization and CDR to reduce
CO2 from a peak of about 600 ppm in 2100 toward 20th century
levels. CMIP-5 ensemble means were used to estimate the
summer SIE minimum sensitivity to greenhouse gas warming.
centuries, depending on how CDR is implemented.
Figure 4 demonstrates two potential futures. One
pathway follows IPCC RCP 8.5 [Riahi et al., 2011] in
the 21st century and then continues unabated, with
CO2 concentrations rising to about triple their current
value. Summer sea ice essentially disappears in the
21st century and never comes back. A second scenario
follows RCP 8.5 until about 2050 but then assumes
aggressive decarbonization, reforestation, and carbon
dioxide capture, with CO2 concentrations returning
below 400 ppm in the 22nd century. For both scenar-
ios, the observed relationship between atmospheric
CO2 concentrations and minimum sea ice extent is
projected into the future using an average of the rela-
tionships in the CMIP RCP8.5 projections.
Little attention has been paid to the likely diversity of
responses to the purposeful reversal of global warm-
ing (Table 2). How will nations and industries in and
outside the Arctic that profit from sea ice-free conditions react to the regrowth of Arctic summer sea ice?
Will the genetic and ecological capital required to rebuild current biomes still be available? Is it possible to
establish the right to reverse Arctic development before it takes place? For example, it has been suggested
that a sea ice reserve be created that would limit development within a region where ice would be restored.
Is it reasonable to believe that future generations, having adapted to a warmer Arctic, will want to return it
to the current state?
As with global-scale SRM, there exists no institutional framework within which to address such issues. Nor
is there consensus about the value of the current Arctic climate among the stakeholders in Arctic climate
change, including the national governments who exercise sovereign rights over all but the central part of
the Arctic Ocean. We are unaware of a precedent for an entire region being driven to fundamentally new
conditions by human action while society debates how a future generation will engineer the transition back.
Interestingly, we confront an environment that is changing in ways that are relatively predictable. We have
the capability to predict what a future return to a “white” Arctic would look like based on a combination
of historical observations and climate models. Does it make sense to issue a “fair warning” to commercial
organizations that development within the historical ice pack should be regarded as temporary? Could the
Arctic nations, for example, draw a line around the late 20th century perennial ice pack and preemptively
limit long-term development there?
7. Moving Forward
The Arctic system will adjust to human activities whether those activities are ad hoc or planned, informed
by scientific understanding of the system or not. If no coordinated, collaborative solutions emerge, then the
way forward will be established by “facts on the ground” that emerge from existing power relations and ad
hoc, short-term coalitions. Those organizations with the greatest capacity for rapid, large-scale mobilization
Table 2. Competing Interests in Having an Ice-Covered (White) or an Ice-Free (Blue) Summer Arctic Ocean
White Arctic Blue Arctic
Arctic residents Arctic residents
Tourism Tourism
Fishing Fishing
Environmental groups Oil, gas, minerals
Global coastal communities/cities—sea level rise Shipping
Global society—temperature maintenance Inertia—existing infrastructure
Northern hemisphere residents—weather?
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(operational government agencies, industrial corporations, investment banks) will dominate the decision
space. Organizations with long time scales between learning and accomplishment (grassroot NGOs, multi-
lateral diplomatic organizations, elected legislatures, scientific organizations) will find themselves perenni-
ally running from behind, frustrated by the gap between the clarity of their vision and the small impact they
have on de facto policy, and local communities will have to deal with changes as they occur around them.
Science has a critical role to play as human communities navigate these contentious issues, and many
scientists now interact directly with policy analysts, NGOs, government officials, and other stakeholders,
both in delivering their results and in setting their research agendas. Others in the scientific community
would rather see a greater separation between their own research activities and “politics.” However, in many
aspects of climate science, the link between fundamental research and policy has become immediate. Sig-
nificant new findings change the ways that stakeholders perceive their interests and how they perceive the
impact of policies on their near and long-term futures. For better or worse, we are now part of the political
process, and it is not useful to act as though the information we deliver is not going to have partisan impacts
and provoke partisan responses.
Finding a policy pathway through the upcoming climatic shifts will require the engagement of working col-
laboratives of scientists, policy analysts, governing bodies, the private sector, Indigenous organizations, and
NGOs. Negotiating solutions involve international strategic considerations—meaning that along with local
communities and state decision makers, national governments will have to play central roles. Participation
of natural and social scientists in these negotiations is imperative.
Lower-latitude nations will also see transitions, both forward to a warmer world and then—we predict—in
returning to a cooler one. Similar issues will arise regarding the interests of communities and industries that
will have adapted to a greenhouse gas world. The current transitions are accidental byproducts of economic
activity, whereas the transition back will be deliberate. Intra- and international conflict will arise in both
directions, and the Arctic will likely be at the leading edge of change both times. This may make it a good
laboratory for the emergence of forms of organization and governance to respond to the first transition and
manage the second. At the same time, Arctic institutions are likely not to dominate the solutions, not even
as they regard sea ice retention. Rather, the Arctic will be but one player in the global geopolitical system
to which it is becoming increasingly bound.
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